当前位置:
X-MOL 学术
›
IET Intell. Transp. Syst.
›
论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Power charging management strategy for electric vehicles based on a Stackelberg game
IET Intelligent Transport Systems ( IF 2.7 ) Pub Date : 2020-04-30 , DOI: 10.1049/iet-its.2019.0122 Fei Zhaoan 1 , Fu Baochuan 1 , Xi Xuefeng 1 , Wu Zhengtian 1 , Chen Zhenping 1 , Xu Xinyin 1
IET Intelligent Transport Systems ( IF 2.7 ) Pub Date : 2020-04-30 , DOI: 10.1049/iet-its.2019.0122 Fei Zhaoan 1 , Fu Baochuan 1 , Xi Xuefeng 1 , Wu Zhengtian 1 , Chen Zhenping 1 , Xu Xinyin 1
Affiliation
Increasing electric vehicles (EV) charging efficiency and reducing charging cost are important issues of EVs power management and key factor that affect the spread of EVs. Researching the competitive relationship between power grids and EV users is the key to solving this problem. Therefore, the authors propose a charging control strategy that is based on a 1-N-type Stackelberg game. In the game, power grid, retailers, and users are all able to do power decision making. Thus, the charging strategy here can flexibly meet different demands of power grid, retailers, and users. The equilibrium of the game model is solved by the inverse induction method. The benefits are compared by simulation, by the disordered charging process, and by charging control methods based on static time-sharing electricity prices. The influence of the parameters on the charging process in the game model is analysed, and the feasibility of the proposed method is verified. Results show that load peak is reduced by 34.9% while users' charging costs are reduced by 25.1%. The approaches they proposed can effectively solve the competition between the two.
中文翻译:
基于Stackelberg博弈的电动汽车充电管理策略
提高电动汽车的充电效率和降低充电成本是电动汽车电源管理的重要问题,也是影响电动汽车普及的关键因素。研究电网与电动汽车用户之间的竞争关系是解决此问题的关键。因此,作者提出了一种基于1-N型Stackelberg游戏的充电控制策略。在游戏中,电网,零售商和用户都可以做出电力决策。因此,这里的充电策略可以灵活地满足电网,零售商和用户的不同需求。博弈模型的平衡通过逆归纳法求解。通过模拟,无序充电过程以及基于静态分时电价的充电控制方法对收益进行比较。在博弈模型中分析了参数对计费过程的影响,验证了该方法的可行性。结果表明,高峰负载减少了34.9%,而用户的充电成本减少了25.1%。他们提出的方法可以有效解决两者之间的竞争。
更新日期:2020-04-30
中文翻译:
基于Stackelberg博弈的电动汽车充电管理策略
提高电动汽车的充电效率和降低充电成本是电动汽车电源管理的重要问题,也是影响电动汽车普及的关键因素。研究电网与电动汽车用户之间的竞争关系是解决此问题的关键。因此,作者提出了一种基于1-N型Stackelberg游戏的充电控制策略。在游戏中,电网,零售商和用户都可以做出电力决策。因此,这里的充电策略可以灵活地满足电网,零售商和用户的不同需求。博弈模型的平衡通过逆归纳法求解。通过模拟,无序充电过程以及基于静态分时电价的充电控制方法对收益进行比较。在博弈模型中分析了参数对计费过程的影响,验证了该方法的可行性。结果表明,高峰负载减少了34.9%,而用户的充电成本减少了25.1%。他们提出的方法可以有效解决两者之间的竞争。