Flavescence dorée is a serious and incurable vine disease transmitted by an insect vector. Focusing on its spatial diffusion and on its control with pesticides, this paper investigates the private strategies of wine producers and their socially optimal counterparts. The socially optimal regulation has to address two externalities regarding private treatment decisions: (a) the insufficient consideration of collective benefits from controlling the vector populations; (b) the failure to take into account environmental damage related to pesticide application. The probability of infection is estimated on French data from a spatial econometric specification. Three alternative assumptions are examined regarding producers' anticipation of the impact of their own treatment: naive, myopic, or farseeing, in increasing order of sophistication. Because of the two dimensions of externalities, no type of anticipation leads to a systematically preferable situation and optimal policy intervention requires a tax for environmental externalities and a subvention for protection externalities.

中文翻译：

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作为空间相互作用的疾病扩散：FlavescenceDorée的案例

黄花do是由昆虫媒介传播的一种严重且无法治愈的藤蔓病。着眼于其空间扩散及其对农药的控制，本文研究了葡萄酒生产商及其社会上最佳对口商的私人策略。社会最优管制必须解决私人治疗决定的两个外部性：（a）对控制病媒种群的集体利益的考虑不足；（b）没有考虑到与农药施用有关的环境损害。感染的可能性是根据空间计量经济学规范中的法国数据估算的。关于生产者对他们自己的治疗效果的预期，检验了三个替代假设：幼稚，近视或远视，以复杂程度递增。