Leadership is critical for the viability of rural groups. The way in which leadership is legitimised can mediate leader and group member behaviour in the face of social dilemmas. Yet there has been scant research on leader‐follower dynamics in naturally occurring groups. Highlighting the case of agricultural machinery circles in Tajikistan, the effect of leading by example on investments to a collective good is studied in a framed field experiment. To increase realism, and contrary to standard economic experiments, this investment is a voucher allowing the group to make a real‐world machinery purchase at reduced costs. Two treatments manipulate leaders’ legitimisation. Elected leaders achieve 30 per cent higher contributions to the collective investment against a baseline version without a leader. Contributions remain, on average, relatively stable over the course of the game. The results are discussed with reference to the debate on external intervention in agricultural producer organisations.

中文翻译：

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农业机械界的领导：塔吉克斯坦的实验证据

领导对于农村群体的生存至关重要。面对社会困境，领导合法化的方式可以调解领导和小组成员的行为。但是，关于自然群体中领导者跟随者动力学的研究很少。以塔吉克斯坦的农业机械界为例，在框架现场试验中研究了以身作则对集体物品投资的影响。为了增加真实性，并且与标准的经济实验相反，此项投资是优惠券，可让该组织以降低的成本购买实际的机械设备。两种待遇操纵着领导人的合法性。当选的领导人实现无领导对基线版本的集体投资30个％的会费。平均而言，贡献仍然是 在整个游戏过程中相对稳定。参考关于农业生产者组织的外部干预的辩论来讨论结果。