I examine the abstraction/representation theory of computation put forward by Horsman et al., connecting it to the broader notion of modeling, and in particular, model-based explanation, as considered by Rosen. I argue that the ‘representational entities’ it depends on cannot themselves be computational, and that, in particular, their representational capacities cannot be realized by computational means, and must remain explanatorily opaque to them. I then propose that representation might be realized by subjective experience (qualia), through being the bearer of the structure of abstract objects that are represented.

中文翻译：

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计算和主观经验的抽象/表征说明

我研究了 Horsman 等人提出的计算的抽象/表示理论，将其与更广泛的建模概念联系起来，尤其是 Rosen 所考虑的基于模型的解释。我认为它所依赖的“表征实体”本身不能是可计算的，特别是，它们的表征能力不能通过计算手段来实现，并且必须对它们保持解释性的不透明。然后我提出，通过成为被表示的抽象对象的结构的承载者，表示可以通过主观经验（qualia）来实现。