We consider n-player non-zero sum games played on finite trees (i.e., sequential games), in which the players have the right to repeatedly update their respective strategies. This generates a dynamics in the game which may eventually stabilise to a Nash Equilibrium, and we study the conditions that guarantee such a dynamics to terminate.

We build on the works of Le Roux and Pauly who have studied the Lazy Improvement Dynamics. We extend these works by first defining a turn-based dynamics, proving that it terminates on subgame perfect equilibria, and showing that several variants do not terminate. Second, we define a variant of Kukushkin's lazy improvement where the players may now form coalitions to change strategies. We show how properties of the players' preferences on the outcomes affect the termination of this dynamics, and we characterise classes of games where it always terminates (in particular two-player games).

我们考虑在有限树上玩过的n人非零和游戏（即顺序游戏），其中玩家有权重复更新各自的策略。这会在游戏中产生动力，最终可能稳定到纳什均衡，我们研究了保证这种动力终止的条件。

我们以Le Roux和Pauly的工作为基础，他们研究了惰性改进动力学。我们首先定义一个基于回合的动力学，证明它在子游戏完美平衡时终止，并证明几种变体不会终止，从而扩展了这些作品。其次，我们定义库库什金的懒惰改进的一种变体，玩家现在可以组成联盟来改变策略。我们展示了玩家对结果的偏好属性如何影响这种动力的终止，并描述了总是终止的游戏类别（特别是两人游戏）。