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Quality of equilibria for selfish bin packing with cost sharing variants
Discrete Optimization ( IF 1.1 ) Pub Date : 2019-11-14 , DOI: 10.1016/j.disopt.2019.100556
György Dósa , Leah Epstein

Bin packing is the problem of splitting a set of items into a minimum number of subsets, called bins, of total sizes no larger than 1, where a solution is called a packing. We study bin packing games where an item also has a positive weight, and given a valid packing of the items, each item has a cost associated with it, such that the cost of an item is the ratio between its weight and the total weight of items packed in its bin. That is, the cost sharing is based linearly on the weights of items. We study several types of Nash equilibria: pure Nash equilibria, strong equilibria, strictly Pareto optimal equilibria, and weakly Pareto optimal equilibria, and show that any game of this class of bin packing games admits all these types of equilibria. We study the (asymptotic) prices of anarchy and stability (POA and POS) of these games with respect to the four types of equilibria. We find that the problem is strongly related to the well-known First Fit algorithm, and all the four POA values are equal to 1.7. The POS values are shown to be equal to 1, except for strong equilibria, for which the POS value is 1.7. Additionally, we study the sub-class of bin packing games with equal weights, where the cost sharing of each bin is uniform in the sense that the cost of a bin is shared equally between its items. We analyze the price of anarchy, and find that this value is strictly smaller than 1.7 and in particular, it is not larger than 1.699396 and it is at least 1.69664.



中文翻译:

自私垃圾箱包装的均衡质量,带有成本分摊的变体

箱装箱是将一组物品分成总数量不大于1的最小数量的子集(箱)的问题,解决方案称为装箱。我们研究装箱游戏,其中一件商品的重量也为正,并且给定了一件有效包装的商品,每件商品都有与之相关的成本,因此,一件商品的成本就是其重量与商品总重量之间的比率物品装在其箱中。即,成本分摊线性地基于项目的权重。我们研究了几种类型的纳什均衡:纯纳什均衡,强均衡,严格的帕累托最优均衡和弱帕累托最优均衡,并证明此类bin装箱博弈的任何博弈都接受所有这些类型的均衡。我们针对四种平衡类型研究了这些游戏的无政府状态和稳定性(渐近)价格(POA和POS)。我们发现问题与知名度密切相关First Fit算法,所有四个POA值均等于1.7。POS值显示为等于1,但强平衡除外,POS值为1.7。另外,我们研究具有相等权重的垃圾箱包装游戏的子类,其中每个垃圾箱的成本分摊是统一的,即垃圾箱的成本在各个物料之间平均分配。我们分析了无政府状态的价格,发现该值严格小于1.7,尤其是不大于1.699396并且至少为1.69664。

更新日期:2019-11-14
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