This paper focuses on transactive energy management in local energy communities and proposes a coalitional game model which considers the presence and utilization of flexible loads and the power output uncertainties from renewable energy sources. The superadditivity and balancedness of the proposed game model are proved rigorously by demonstrating that a nucleolus-based solution leads to a stable and fair payoff distribution scheme for all players. More specifically, the objective function is proved concave with its analytical expression, derived through an approximated piecewise linear function. The proposed allocation of realized payoffs is then proved to converge consistently to a nucleolus-based solution. It is demonstrated by numerical simulations that the grand coalition effectively increases the global payoff and the proposed allocation scheme contributes to peak shaving and valley filling in the overall load profile.

中文翻译：

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地方能源社区中基于联盟博弈的交互能源管理

本文侧重于当地能源社区的交互能源管理，并提出了一种联合博弈模型，该模型考虑了灵活负载的存在和利用以及可再生能源的功率输出不确定性。通过证明基于核仁的解决方案为所有参与者带来稳定和公平的收益分配方案，所提出的博弈模型的超可加性和平衡性得到了严格证明。更具体地说，目标函数被证明是凹的，其解析表达式是通过近似分段线性函数导出的。然后证明已实现收益的提议分配一致地收敛于基于核仁的解决方案。