We study entry deterrence in air transport markets with a full-service (FS) carrier (the incumbent) and a low-cost (LC) carrier (the potential entrant). We consider a vertically differentiated product model where airlines have different operating cost and different generalized prices so they compete in ticket prices and frequencies. Thus, more frequency allows airlines to increase ticket prices without losing demand. In this context, we show that the incumbent may increase the frequency offered in order to deter the LC carrier entry. We show that if the airport capacity is low enough the LC carrier entry can be easily blocked or deterred. However, if the airport capacity is sufficiently high, the LC carrier entry must be accommodated. Regulators should take these results into account in order to promote competition among airlines.

我们以全方位服务（FS）承运人（现任）和低成本（LC）承运人（潜在进入者）研究航空运输市场中的进入威慑力。我们考虑一种垂直差异化的产品模型，其中航空公司具有不同的运营成本和不同的广义价格，因此它们在机票价格和频率上竞争。因此，更多的频率允许航空公司在不损失需求的情况下提高机票价格。在这种情况下，我们表明，现有运营商可能会增加提供的频率，以阻止LC载波进入。我们表明，如果机场容量足够低，LC承运人的进入很容易被阻止或制止。但是，如果机场容量足够高，LC必须容纳承运人入境。监管机构应考虑这些结果，以促进航空公司之间的竞争。