Space information network (SIN), which has the characteristics of large capacity, high reliability, and wide coverage, can be effectively applied to the Internet of Things (IoT) business. However, SIN is vulnerable to various attacks due to its highly exposed links, and the power and processing capacity of satellites and IoT devices (IoTDs) are usually limited. Meanwhile, massive IoTDs connecting to SIN in an instant incur a severe signaling congestion and there is no authentication protocol proposed for massive IoTDs in SIN. In this article, we first propose a novel semi-aggregated signature mechanism and session key agreement mechanism. Then, based on the above two mechanisms, we propose a novel access authentication scheme named lattice-based access authentication (LAA) which contains two types of lattice-based authentication protocols: 1) LAA for massive IoTDs and 2) LAA for a single IoTD. The security analysis by employing the formal provable security analysis, the automation verification tool named Scyther, the Burrows–Abadi–Needham-logic, and the informal security analysis demonstrate that our proposed protocols successfully achieve these security properties, including mutual authentication, conditional anonymity, unlinkability, data confidentiality, data integrity, unforgeability, undeniability, key establishment, perfect forward/backward secrecy (PFS/PBS), and resistance against protocol attacks and quantum attacks. We further evaluate the performance of our proposed protocols with regard to signaling overhead, transmission overhead, computational overhead, and authentication delay, which shows that our proposed protocols can provide high efficiency.

中文翻译：

---

LAA：空间信息网络中基于IoT的基于格的访问认证方案

具有大容量，高可靠性和覆盖范围广的特点的空间信息网络（SIN）可以有效地应用于物联网（IoT）业务。但是，由于SIN的链路高度暴露，因此它很容易受到各种攻击，并且卫星和IoT设备（IoTD）的能力和处理能力通常受到限制。同时，大规模的IoTD立即连接到SIN会导致严重的信号拥塞，并且SIN中没有针对大规模IoTD提出认证协议。在本文中，我们首先提出一种新颖的半聚合签名机制和会话密钥协商机制。然后，基于以上两种机制，我们提出了一种新颖的访问认证方案，称为基于网格的访问认证（LAA），其中包含两种类型的基于网格的认证协议：1）适用于大型IoTD的LAA，以及2）适用于单个IoTD的LAA。通过使用正式可证明的安全性分析，名为Scyther的自动化验证工具，Burrows–Abadi–Needham-logic以及非正式的安全性分析进行的安全性分析表明，我们提出的协议成功实现了这些安全性，包括相互身份验证，条件匿名，不可链接性，数据机密性，数据完整性，不可伪造性，不可否认性，密钥建立，完美的前向/后向保密性（PFS / PBS），以及对协议攻击和量子攻击的抵抗力。我们在信令开销，传输开销，计算开销和认证延迟方面进一步评估了我们提出的协议的性能，这表明我们提出的协议可以提供高效率。