Though recent advancements in dc microgrids are largely based on distributed control strategies to enhance reliability and scalability, the absence of a centralized controller to check the global information makes these schemes highly susceptible to cyber attacks. Since false data injection attacks (FDIAs) are considered as a prominent attack methodology in dc microgrids, prior emphasis is usually laid on compromised sensors and controllers only related to dc voltages. Hence, this article first segregates the FDIAs on the output currents into destablization and deception attacks, based on the modeling of attack elements with respect to the consensus theory. Second, a discordant element based detection approach is designed to detect the attacked nodes accurately, using an extended analysis of the cooperative control network. A risk assessment framework for dc microgrids against cyber attacks is provided alongside all the case studies. An evaluation theory is also presented to assist the proposed detection scheme to differentiate between cyber attacks and faults. Further, the proposed detection approach is theoretically verified and validated using simulation and experimental conditions.

中文翻译：

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协同直流微电网中虚假数据的检测——一种不协调元素法

尽管直流微电网的最新进展主要基于分布式控制策略以提高可靠性和可扩展性，但由于没有集中控制器来检查全局信息，因此这些方案非常容易受到网络攻击。由于虚假数据注入攻击 (FDIA) 被认为是直流微电网中的一种突出攻击方法，因此优先重点通常放在仅与直流电压相关的受损传感器和控制器上。因此，本文首先基于与共识理论相关的攻击元素建模，将输出电流上的 FDIA 分为不稳定攻击和欺骗攻击。其次，使用基于协同控制网络的扩展分析，设计了一种基于不一致元素的检测方法来准确检测被攻击的节点。与所有案例研究一起提供了针对网络攻击的直流微电网风险评估框架。还提出了一种评估理论，以帮助所提出的检测方案区分网络攻击和故障。此外，所提出的检测方法使用模拟和实验条件进行了理论上的验证和验证。