ABSTRACT Numerous situations in decision-making deal with a set of agents who need to work together but they have some a priori bilateral problems among them. This paper introduces cooperative games with a priori incompatibilities using particular coalition systems. In these games, there are some red lines between some players, so that the negotiation has two stages. In the first stage, players can only negotiate with those with whom they are compatible. After that, the grand coalition will be formed. A value for these games is defined by using cooperative games with coalition configuration. A characterization of this value is obtained.

中文翻译：

---

具有先验不兼容玩家的游戏的价值

摘要 决策中的许多情况涉及一组需要协同工作的代理，但它们之间存在一些先验的双边问题。本文介绍了使用特定联盟系统具有先验不兼容性的合作博弈。在这些游戏中，一些玩家之间存在一些红线，因此谈判分为两个阶段。在第一阶段，玩家只能与他们相容的人进行谈判。之后，将组建大联盟。这些游戏的价值是通过使用具有联盟配置的合作游戏来定义的。获得该值的表征。