The US Endangered Species Act (ESA) is an important safety net for the protection and recovery of critically imperiled species. One mechanism of the ESA is prohibitions on harming listed species and their habitat, yet the ESA does not require proactive conservation by the private sector, which is necessary for the recovery of many species. A range of ESA programs have been developed – including Candidate Conservation Agreements, Safe Harbor Agreements, and a Voluntary Prelisting Conservation Actions policy – to enhance flexibility and encourage voluntary conservation activities. But why would businesses and other private landowners voluntarily engage in proactive conservation efforts above and beyond what is required for ESA compliance? We applied a return‐on‐investment (ROI) perspective to outline sources of costs and benefits and to explore program participation incentives. This ROI perspective sheds light on the types of financial factors likely to affect private‐sector participation and program effectiveness, and points to better ways to target private‐sector engagement and design more effective programs.

中文翻译：

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《美国濒危物种法》规定的私营部门保护：投资回报率的观点

美国濒临灭绝物种法案（ESA）是保护和恢复危难物种的重要安全网。ESA的一种机制是禁止损害所列物种及其栖息地，但是ESA不需要私营部门的积极保护，这对于恢复许多物种是必要的。已制定了一系列ESA计划，包括候选保护协议，安全港协议和自愿性清单前保护行动政策，以提高灵活性并鼓励自愿保护活动。但是，为什么企业和其他私人土地所有者会自愿地在超出遵守ESA要求的范围之外主动进行保护工作？我们运用投资回报率（ROI）来概述成本和收益的来源，并探索计划参与的激励措施。这种投资回报率的观点揭示了可能影响私营部门参与和计划有效性的财务因素的类型，并指出了针对私营部门参与和设计更有效计划的更好方法。