Pressure from environmental responsibility and production cost reduction have been driving the rapid development of remanufacturing industry. This paper focuses on a competitive closed-loop supply chain consisting of two leading original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and two third-party remanufacturers (TPRs). Two third-party remanufacturing modes are considered, namely, outsourcing mode and authorization mode. Considering that decision is actually a dynamic evolution process constrained by bounded rationality, evolutionary game model is selected to investigate the optimal selection of these two modes. The results show that the duopoly OEMs always prefer the outsourcing strategy. By contrast, the duopoly TPRs’ selection preferences are diverse. Specifically, when per unit new product production cost is low or consumers have a high value perception of the remanufactured product, the outsourcing strategy would be preferred by the duopoly TPRs, otherwise the authorization strategy will be selected. Moreover, the outsourcing strategy is always conducive to the profit of the whole supply chain (SC). Finally, to realize the Pareto improvement of the profit for OEM,TPR and SC, an outsourcing subsidy scheme dominated by the leading duopoly OEMs is designed.

来自环境责任和降低生产成本的压力一直在推动再制造行业的快速发展。本文重点讨论由两个领先的原始设备制造商（OEM）和两个第三方再制造商（TPR）组成的竞争性闭环供应链。考虑了两种第三方再制造模式，即外包模式和授权模式。考虑到决策实际上是受有限理性约束的动态演化过程，因此选择演化博弈模型来研究这两种模式的最优选择。结果表明，双头垄断的OEM总是喜欢外包策略。相比之下，双寡头TPR的选择偏好是多种多样的。特别，当每单位新产品的生产成本较低或消费者对再制造产品的价值较高时，双头TPR将首选外包策略，否则将选择授权策略。而且，外包策略总是有利于整个供应链（SC）的利润。最后，为了实现帕累托提高OEM，TPR和SC的利润，设计了由领先的双头垄断OEM主导的外包补贴计划。