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Competitive Statistical Estimation with Strategic Data Sources
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control ( IF 6.8 ) Pub Date : 2020-04-01 , DOI: 10.1109/tac.2019.2922190
Tyler Westenbroek , Roy Dong , Lillian J. Ratliff , S. Shankar Sastry

In recent years, data have played an increasingly important role in the economy as a good in its own right. In many settings, data aggregators cannot directly verify the quality of the data they purchase, nor the effort exerted by data sources when creating the data. Recent work has explored mechanisms to ensure that the data sources share high-quality data with a single data aggregator, addressing the issue of moral hazard. Oftentimes, there is a unique, socially efficient solution. In this paper, we consider data markets where there is more than one data aggregator. Since data can be cheaply reproduced and transmitted once created, data sources may share the same data with more than one aggregator, leading to free-riding between data aggregators. This coupling can lead to nonuniqueness of equilibria and social inefficiency. We examine a particular class of mechanisms that have received study recently in the literature, and we characterize all the generalized Nash (GN) equilibria of the resulting data market. We show that, in contrast to the single-aggregator case, there is either infinitely many GN equilibria or none. We also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for all equilibria to be socially inefficient. In our analysis, we identify the components of these mechanisms that give rise to these undesirable outcomes, showing the need for research into mechanisms for competitive settings with multiple data purchasers and sellers.

中文翻译:

使用战略数据源进行竞争统计估计

近年来,数据本身作为一种商品在经济中发挥着越来越重要的作用。在许多情况下,数据聚合器无法直接验证他们购买的数据的质量,也无法直接验证数据源在创建数据时所付出的努力。最近的工作探索了确保数据源与单个数据聚合器共享高质量数据的机制,以解决道德风险问题。通常,有一种独特的、对社会有效的解决方案。在本文中,我们考虑存在多个数据聚合器的数据市场。由于数据一旦创建就可以廉价地复制和传输,因此数据源可能会与多个聚合器共享相同的数据,从而导致数据聚合器之间的搭便车。这种耦合会导致均衡的非唯一性和社会低效率。我们研究了最近在文献中接受研究的一类特定机制,并描述了由此产生的数据市场的所有广义纳什 (GN) 均衡。我们表明,与单一聚合器的情况相比,要么有无限多个 GN 均衡,要么没有。我们还提供了使所有均衡在社会上无效率的充分必要条件。在我们的分析中,我们确定了导致这些不良结果的这些机制的组成部分,表明需要研究具有多个数据购买者和销售者的竞争环境的机制。要么有无穷多个 GN 均衡,要么没有。我们还提供了使所有均衡在社会上无效率的充分必要条件。在我们的分析中,我们确定了导致这些不良结果的这些机制的组成部分,表明需要研究具有多个数据购买者和销售者的竞争环境的机制。要么有无穷多个 GN 均衡,要么没有。我们还提供了使所有均衡在社会上无效率的充分必要条件。在我们的分析中,我们确定了导致这些不良结果的这些机制的组成部分,表明需要研究具有多个数据购买者和销售者的竞争环境的机制。
更新日期:2020-04-01
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