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An epistemic logic of blameworthiness
Artificial Intelligence ( IF 14.4 ) Pub Date : 2020-06-01 , DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2020.103269
Pavel Naumov , Jia Tao

Abstract Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents can be defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition should be a minimal one that had a strategy to prevent the outcome. In this article we argue that in the settings with imperfect information, not only should the coalition have had a strategy, but it also should be the minimal one that knew that it had a strategy and what the strategy was. The main technical result of the article is a sound and complete bimodal logic that describes the interplay between knowledge and blameworthiness in strategic games with imperfect information.

中文翻译:

可指责性的认知逻辑

摘要 代理人或代理人联盟的可责性可以根据替代可能性原则来定义:联盟要对结果负责,结果必须发生,联盟应该是最小的联盟,它有一个策略防止结果。在本文中,我们认为,在信息不完善的环境中,联盟不仅应该有战略,而且还应该是知道自己有战略和战略是什么的最小联盟。这篇文章的主要技术成果是一个健全和完整的双峰逻辑,它描述了在信息不完善的战略博弈中知识和可责性之间的相互作用。
更新日期:2020-06-01
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