Sustainability is a prevalent topic as the consumers and the governments are much more concerned about the environmental pollution. To reduce the carbon emission, in real world practice, governments have executed different forms of policies to motivate the firms to operate in a sustainable manner. This paper aims to examine the value of bargaining contract when the supply chain member invests in the sustainability projects, and explore the effectiveness of the direct (e.g., cash grant) and indirect (e.g., an increased environmental tax rate) subsidies in reducing the total carbon emission. We first derive the optimal pricing and sustainability effort under the wholesale pricing contract when either the manufacturer or the retailer makes the sustainability investment. We then consider the supply chain coordination under the two-part tariff, revenue sharing, and bargaining contracts. We uncover that only the bargaining contract can coordinate the supply chain and a Pareto improvement is achieved when the bargaining power of the manufacturer is in a specific range. Finally, we reveal that both the direct and indirect subsidies can increase the sustainability effort but they are not always an effective tool to reduce the total carbon emissions.

中文翻译：

---

具有可持续性投资的供应链系统中的谈判合同价值：激励分析

可持续发展是一个普遍的话题，因为消费者和政府更加关注环境污染。为了减少碳排放，在现实世界的实践中，政府执行了不同形式的政策来激励企业以可持续的方式运营。本文旨在检验供应链成员投资可持续发展项目时谈判合同的价值，并探讨直接（如现金补助）和间接（如提高环境税率）补贴在减少总量方面的有效性。碳排放。当制造商或零售商进行可持续性投资时，我们首先根据批发定价合同推导出最优定价和可持续性努力。然后我们考虑两部分关税下的供应链协调，收益分享和谈判合同。我们发现只有议价合同才能协调供应链，当制造商的议价能力在特定范围内时，实现帕累托改进。最后，我们揭示了直接和间接补贴都可以增加可持续性努力，但它们并不总是减少碳排放总量的有效工具。