We consider multiple self-interested bounded-rational agents each of which has a goal it needs to achieve. Goals are achievable by executing a set of interdependent tasks. Some tasks exhibit time dependencies and may require sequential execution. For each agent, there may be several alternative sets of tasks that can achieve the goal. Execution of alternatives, may be more beneficial when done by a group of agents and not by a single agent. To jointly achieve goals, agents may form interdependent coalitions. Such coalition formation is computationally intractable. We nevertheless seek a practical solution that is not necessarily optimal yet acceptable by the agents. A solution where agents examine only coalitions in which they are members is inapplicable, as externalities are a major factor given task interdependencies. In this paper we study this coalition formation problem. We describe the problem and introduce a novel Multi-lateral Negotiation Protocol ($\mathcal{MNP}$) that solves it by forming interdependent coalitions. We allow agents to heuristically make gradual concessions, revise their proposals and converge on specific alternatives, and nevertheless increase their expected gains.

我们考虑了多个具有自身利益的有限理性个体，每个个体都有其需要实现的目标。通过执行一组相互依赖的任务可以实现目标。一些任务表现出时间依赖性，可能需要顺序执行。对于每个代理，可能有几组替代任务可以实现目标。当由一组代理而不是单个代理执行时，执行替代方案可能会更加有益。为了共同实现目标，代理商可以形成相互依存的关系联盟。这种联盟的形成在计算上是棘手的。尽管如此，我们仍在寻求一种实用的解决方案，该解决方案不一定是最佳的，但代理商可以接受。代理仅检查其所属联盟的解决方案不适用，因为外部性是任务相互依赖的主要因素。在本文中，我们研究了这个联盟形成问题。我们描述了问题，并介绍了一种新颖的多边谈判协议（$\mathcal{国民生产总值}$），这可以通过形成相互依存的联盟来解决。我们允许代理商试探性地逐步做出让步，修改他们的建议并集中于特定的替代方案，但是仍然增加他们的预期收益。