Abstract Agricultural water markets play a crucial role in arid and semi-arid regions by reallocating water and transferring it from low-value uses to high-value uses. Several markets for surface water and groundwater are functioning all over the world to increase economic well-being of farmers and meet environmental flow requirements. However, there is not a consensus on precisely which market mechanism may be more environmentally and economically beneficial. This study presents an agent-based groundwater market model to analyze the economic and hydrologic impacts of three market mechanisms, designed based on the cap-and-trade scheme, that differ in the price discovery process, two of which are uniform price double-auction and the third is a discriminatory price double-auction. This study also analyzes the hydrologic and economic impacts of water buyback programs. Modeling results, applied to Rafsanjan Plain, an arid region in Iran, show that the discriminatory price double-auction is the most hydrologically and economically advantageous mechanism since it reduces the annual water level drawdown by 38 % and brings about more profits for farmers in comparison with other market mechanisms. Furthermore, the buyback program effectively reduces the inequality of wealth distribution (Gini Index) and increases farmers' net benefit while reducing their surplus.

中文翻译：

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基于代理的水经济模型分析地下水灌溉水市场机制

摘要 农业水市场通过重新分配水资源并将其从低价值用途转移到高价值用途，在干旱和半干旱地区发挥着至关重要的作用。世界各地有几个地表水和地下水市场正在发挥作用，以提高农民的经济福利并满足环境流量要求。然而，对于究竟哪种市场机制可能对环境和经济更有利，还没有达成共识。本研究提出了一个基于代理的地下水市场模型来分析三种市场机制的经济和水文影响，该机制基于限额与交易计划设计，在价格发现过程中有所不同，其中两种是统一价格双重拍卖三是歧视性价格双重拍卖。本研究还分析了水回购计划的水文和经济影响。应用于伊朗干旱地区 Rafsanjan 平原的建模结果表明，歧视性价格双重拍卖是最具有水文和经济优势的机制，相比之下，它使年水位下降 38% 并为农民带来更多利润与其他市场机制。此外，回购计划有效地减少了财富分配的不平等（基尼指数），增加了农民的净收益，同时减少了他们的盈余。表明歧视性价格双重拍卖是最具水文和经济优势的机制，因为与其他市场机制相比，它使年水位下降 38% 并为农民带来更多利润。此外，回购计划有效地减少了财富分配的不平等（基尼指数），增加了农民的净收益，同时减少了他们的盈余。表明歧视性价格双重拍卖是最具水文和经济优势的机制，因为与其他市场机制相比，它使年水位下降 38% 并为农民带来更多利润。此外，回购计划有效地减少了财富分配的不平等（基尼指数），增加了农民的净收益，同时减少了他们的盈余。