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Recognizing animal personhood in compassionate conservation
Conservation Biology ( IF 6.3 ) Pub Date : 2020-05-18 , DOI: 10.1111/cobi.13494
Arian D Wallach 1 , Chelsea Batavia 2 , Marc Bekoff 3 , Shelley Alexander 4 , Liv Baker 5 , Dror Ben-Ami 1, 6 , Louise Boronyak 1, 7 , Adam P A Cardilin 8 , Yohay Carmel 9 , Danielle Celermajer 10 , Simon Coghlan 11 , Yara Dahdal 12 , Jonatan J Gomez 13 , Gisela Kaplan 14 , Oded Keynan 6, 15 , Anton Khalilieh 12 , Helen Kopnina 16 , William S Lynn 17 , Yamini Narayanan 18 , Sophie Riley 1, 19 , Francisco J Santiago-Ávila 20 , Esty Yanco 1 , Miriam A Zemanova 1 , Daniel Ramp 1
Affiliation  

Abstract Compassionate conservation is based on the ethical position that actions taken to protect biodiversity should be guided by compassion for all sentient beings. Critics argue that there are 3 core reasons harming animals is acceptable in conservation programs: the primary purpose of conservation is biodiversity protection; conservation is already compassionate to animals; and conservation should prioritize compassion to humans. We used argument analysis to clarify the values and logics underlying the debate around compassionate conservation. We found that objections to compassionate conservation are expressions of human exceptionalism, the view that humans are of a categorically separate and higher moral status than all other species. In contrast, compassionate conservationists believe that conservation should expand its moral community by recognizing all sentient beings as persons. Personhood, in an ethical sense, implies the individual is owed respect and should not be treated merely as a means to other ends. On scientific and ethical grounds, there are good reasons to extend personhood to sentient animals, particularly in conservation. The moral exclusion or subordination of members of other species legitimates the ongoing manipulation and exploitation of the living worlds, the very reason conservation was needed in the first place. Embracing compassion can help dismantle human exceptionalism, recognize nonhuman personhood, and navigate a more expansive moral space.

中文翻译:

在富有同情心的保护中认识动物的人格

摘要 慈悲保护是基于这样一种伦理立场,即保护生物多样性的行动应该以对所有有情众生的慈悲为指导。批评者认为,保护计划中可以接受伤害动物的三个核心原因:保护的主要目的是保护生物多样性;保护已经对动物富有同情心;保护应该优先考虑对人类的同情。我们使用论证分析来阐明围绕同情保护的争论背后的价值观和逻辑。我们发现,反对富有同情心的保护是人类例外论的表达,即认为人类与所有其他物种相比具有绝对的独立性和更高的道德地位。相比之下,富有同情心的保护主义者认为,保护应该通过将所有有情众生视为人来扩大其道德社区。从伦理意义上讲,人格意味着个人应受到尊重,不应仅仅被视为达到其他目的的手段。从科学和伦理的角度来看,有充分的理由将人格扩展到有知觉的动物身上,尤其是在保护方面。其他物种成员的道德排斥或从属使对生物世界的持续操纵和剥削合法化,这正是需要保护的首要原因。拥抱同情心可以帮助消除人类例外论,识别非人类人格,并在更广阔的道德空间中导航。暗示个人应受到尊重,不应仅被视为达到其他目的的手段。从科学和伦理的角度来看,有充分的理由将人格扩展到有知觉的动物身上,尤其是在保护方面。其他物种成员的道德排斥或从属使对生物世界的持续操纵和剥削合法化,这正是需要保护的首要原因。拥抱同情心可以帮助消除人类例外论,识别非人类人格,并在更广阔的道德空间中导航。暗示个人应受到尊重,不应仅被视为达到其他目的的手段。从科学和伦理的角度来看,有充分的理由将人格扩展到有知觉的动物身上,尤其是在保护方面。其他物种成员的道德排斥或从属使对生物世界的持续操纵和剥削合法化,这正是需要保护的首要原因。拥抱同情心可以帮助消除人类例外论,识别非人类人格,并在更广阔的道德空间中导航。其他物种成员的道德排斥或从属使对生物世界的持续操纵和剥削合法化,这正是需要保护的首要原因。拥抱同情心可以帮助消除人类例外论,识别非人类人格,并在更广阔的道德空间中导航。其他物种成员的道德排斥或从属使对生物世界的持续操纵和剥削合法化,这正是需要保护的首要原因。拥抱同情心可以帮助消除人类例外论,识别非人类人格,并在更广阔的道德空间中导航。
更新日期:2020-05-18
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