The task of aggregating individual judgments over logically interconnected propositions is called judgment aggregation. Manipulation of judgment aggregation procedures has first been studied by List [45] and Dietrich and List [27], and Endriss et al. [30] were the first to study it from a computational perspective. Baumeister et al. [7] extended their results on manipulation and introduced the concept of bribery in judgment aggregation, again focusing on algorithmic and complexity-theoretic properties. Complementing this previous work on strategic scenarios, we introduce the concept of control in judgment aggregation, making use of the preference types introduced by Dietrich and List [27] and studying the class of uniform premise-based quota rules for these control problems in terms of their computational complexity.

汇总逻辑上相互关联的命题的各个判断的任务称为判断汇总。List [45]和Dietrich and List [27]以及Endriss等人首先研究了判断汇总程序的操作。[30]是第一个从计算角度研究它的人。Baumeister等。[7]扩展了他们在操纵上的结果，并在判断汇总中引入了贿赂的概念，再次着重于算法和复杂性-理论特性。作为对上述战略场景工作的补充，我们引入了判断聚合中的控制概念，利用了Dietrich和List [27]引入的偏好类型，并针对这些控制问题研究了基于前提的统一配额规则的类别。它们的计算复杂度。