We present a market-based approach to the Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) problem. The goods in our market are delays and buyers are airline companies; the latter pay money to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to buy away the desired amount of delay on a per flight basis. We give a notion of equilibrium for this market and an LP whose every optimal solution gives an equilibrium allocation of flights to landing slots as well as equilibrium prices for the landing slots. Via a reduction to matching, we show that this equilibrium can be computed combinatorially in strongly polynomial time. Moreover, there is a special set of equilibrium prices, which can be computed easily, that is identical to the VCG solution, and therefore the market is incentive compatible (truthful) in dominant strategy.

我们提出了一种基于市场的空中交通流量管理（ATFM）问题的方法。我们市场上的货物属于延误，买方是航空公司。后者向美国联邦航空管理局（FAA）付款，以按每次航班购买所需的延迟量。我们给出了这个市场的均衡概念，以及一个LP，它的每个最优解都给出了到着陆点的航班的均衡分配以及着陆点的均衡价格。通过减少匹配，我们表明可以在强多项式时间内组合计算此平衡。此外，还有一组特殊的均衡价格，可以很容易地计算出，该均衡价格与VCG解决方案相同，因此市场在主导策略中具有激励相容性（真实）。