Although people often recognize the moral value of impartial behavior (i.e., not favoring specific individuals), it is unclear when, if ever, people recognize the moral value of partiality. The current studies investigated whether information about special obligations to specific individuals, particularly kin, is integrated into moral judgments. In Studies 1 and 2, agents who helped a stranger were judged as more morally good and trustworthy than those who helped kin, but agents who helped a stranger, instead of kin were judged as less morally good and trustworthy than those who did the opposite. In Studies 3 and 4, agents who simply neglected a stranger were judged as less morally bad and untrustworthy than those who neglected kin. Study 4 also demonstrated that the violation (vs. fulfillment) of perceived obligations underlaid all judgment patterns. Study 5 demonstrated boundary conditions: When occupying roles requiring impartiality, agents who helped a stranger instead of kin were judged as more morally good and trustworthy than agents who did the opposite. These findings illuminate the importance of obligations in structuring moral judgment.

中文翻译：

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我们欠家庭的：特殊义务对道德判断的影响

尽管人们常常承认公正行为的道德价值（即不偏袒特定个人），但不清楚人们何时（如果有的话）承认偏袒的道德价值。当前的研究调查了关于对特定个人，尤其是亲属的特殊义务的信息是否被整合到道德判断中。在研究 1 和 2 中，帮助陌生人的代理人被认为比帮助亲属的代理人在道德上更善良、更值得信赖，但帮助陌生人而不是亲属的代理人被认为比做相反事情的代理人在道德上更不善良和更值得信赖。在研究 3 和 4 中，仅仅忽视陌生人的代理人被认为比忽视亲属的代理人在道德上不那么坏和不值得信任。研究 4 还证明了违规（与 履行）的感知义务是所有判断模式的基础。研究 5 展示了边界条件：当担任需要公正的角色时，帮助陌生人而不是亲属的代理人被认为比做相反行为的代理人在道德上更善良、更值得信赖。这些发现阐明了义务在构建道德判断中的重要性。