In the history of clinical and personality psychology, Carl Jung has always appealed to the romantics. When the stimulus-response paradigms of mid-20th-century behaviorism put something of a stranglehold on psychological science, a few rebels found inspiration in Jung’s forays into the deep contents of the human mind (e.g., Murray, 1938). When midcentury clinicians found Freud’s pronouncements about human nature to be too dreary and overly obsessed with the sexual instinct, a number of them embraced Jung’s rival approach instead. With his vivid descriptions of mythic archetypes and the creative powers of individuation, Jung articulated an exciting vision for human development as a lifelong quest for actualization and transcendence. Along with humanistic scholars like Rogers (1951), Maslow (1968), and Frankl (1965), Jung appealed to psychological clinicians and researchers who tended to view human lives as intrapsychic mysteries replete with deep meaning and universal significance (e.g., Carlson, 1980; Thorne & Gough, 1991; Yalom, 1989). And yet there has always been something vaguely disreputable about Jung, at least in scientific circles. D. Vaughn Becker and Steven L. Neuberg (this issue) speak dismissively of the “soft appropriations” of Jung in “new age” and “pop” psychology. They are doubtlessly referring to the plethora of contemporary books, articles, workshops, and websites devoted to spiritual development, often drawing from Eastern meditative traditions and ancient myths. Jung is a perennial favorite in this wide-ranging literature. Informed by serious scholarship on myth and folklore in the humanities, some of these offerings provide important insights into human behavior and experience (e.g., Feinstein & Krippner, 2007; Hillman, 1978), whereas some traffic in mysticism, the occult, and other more obscure practices and ideologies. Of course, Jung himself predated the “new age” movement—by several centuries, one could argue! Jung lived between the years 1875 and 1961, but his sensibility was decidedly more medieval than modern. Becker and Neuberg try to make Jung sound as if he were an intellectual cousin of Darwin. But the truth is that Jung was much more comfortable deciphering 17th-century alchemical texts and musing on the multiple meanings of ancient Mayan ruins than he was thinking about natural selection. It is not clear that Jung truly understood the theory of evolution through natural selection. Like his conception of human ontogeny itself, Jung seemed to believe that evolution directed itself to greater wholeness and integration over time, perhaps guided by a transcendent force. Moreover, Jung adhered to a discredited Lamarckian understanding of genetic inheritance. He even believed that dreams could predict the future. Still, Jung happened upon observations that, in retrospect and when taken out of the context of his own very different worldview, seem to be quite simpatico with certain themes that today lie at the intersection of evolutionary theory and cognitive science. Becker and Neuberg are not the first to try to rehabilitate Jung. In an important and overlooked formulation, Stevens (1983) explicitly couched the concept of Jungian archetypes in evolutionary terms. He saw archetypes as akin to flexible fixed-action patterns, holding the power to release ingrained sequences of thought, feeling, and behavior in response to paradigmatic human situations. In the animal kingdom, Stevens argued, fixed-action patterns mediate behavioral sequences for eating, mating, fighting, rearing offspring, and other tasks of supreme adaptive significance. So it is with archetypes and the human being, Stevens argued,

中文翻译：

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康复荣格

在临床心理学和人格心理学的历史上，荣格一直吸引着浪漫主义者。当 20 世纪中叶行为主义的刺激-反应范式对心理科学施加某种束缚时，一些反叛者在荣格对人类思维深层内容的探索中找到了灵感（例如，Murray，1938）。当本世纪中叶的临床医生发现弗洛伊德关于人性的声明过于沉闷且过于沉迷于性本能时，他们中的一些人转而接受了荣格的敌对方法。荣格对神话原型和个性化的创造力的生动描述，阐明了人类发展的激动人心的愿景，即对实现和超越的终生追求。与罗杰斯 (1951)、马斯洛 (1968) 和弗兰克 (1965) 等人文主义学者一起，荣格吸引了心理临床医生和研究人员，他们倾向于将人类生活视为充满深刻意义和普遍意义的内心奥秘（例如，Carlson，1980；Thorne & Gough，1991；Yalom，1989）。然而，荣格总是有一些模糊的声名狼藉，至少在科学界是如此。D. Vaughn Becker 和 Steven L. Neuberg（本期）对荣格在“新时代”和“流行”心理学中的“软挪用”不屑一顾。毫无疑问，他们指的是大量致力于精神发展的当代书籍、文章、研讨会和网站，通常来自东方的冥想传统和古代神话。荣格是这些广泛文学作品中的常客。通过对人文科学中神话和民间传说的严肃学术研究，其中一些产品提供了对人类行为和经验的重要见解（例如，Feinstein & Krippner，2007；Hillman，1978），而一些则涉及神秘主义、神秘学和其他更晦涩的实践和意识形态。当然，荣格本人早于“新时代”运动——可以争辩几个世纪！荣格生活在 1875 年至 1961 年之间，但他的感性显然更像是中世纪而非现代。贝克尔和纽伯格试图让荣格听起来好像他是达尔文的知识分子表亲。但事实是，与考虑自然选择相比，荣格更愿意破译 17 世纪的炼金术文本并沉思古代玛雅遗址的多重含义。尚不清楚荣格是否真正理解了自然选择进化论。就像他对人类个体发育本身的概念一样，荣格似乎相信随着时间的推移，进化将自身导向更大的整体性和整合性，也许是由一种超然的力量引导。此外，荣格坚持对基因遗传的不可信的拉马克式理解。他甚至相信梦可以预知未来。尽管如此，荣格还是发现了一些观察，回想起来，当他脱离自己截然不同的世界观的背景时，似乎与今天处于进化理论和认知科学交叉点的某些主题相当简单。贝克尔和纽伯格并不是第一个试图让荣格康复的人。史蒂文斯（Stevens，1983）在一个重要但被忽视的表述中明确地用进化术语表达了荣格原型的概念。他认为原型类似于灵活的固定动作模式，拥有释放根深蒂固的思想、感觉和行为序列的能力，以应对典型的人类情况。史蒂文斯认为，在动物王国中，固定动作模式介导了进食、交​​配、战斗、抚养后代和其他具有最高适应性意义的任务的行为序列。史蒂文斯认为，原型和人类也是如此，