The appearance of the flexible behavior of end-users based on demand response programs makes the power distribution grids more active. Thus, electricity market participants in the bottom layer of the power system, wish to be involved in the decision-making process related to local energy management problems, increasing the efficiency of the energy trade in distribution networks. This paper proposes monopolistic and game-based approaches for the management of energy flexibility through end-users, aggregators, and the Distribution System Operator (DSO) which are defined as agents in the power distribution system. Besides, a 33-bus distribution network is considered to evaluate the performance of our proposed approaches for energy flexibility management model based on impact of flexibility behaviors of end-users and aggregators in the distribution network. According to the simulation results, it is concluded that although the monopolistic approach could be profitable for all agents in the distribution network, the game-based approach is not profitable for end-users.

中文翻译：

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交易能源灵活性的垄断和基于游戏的方法

基于需求响应程序的终端用户灵活行为的出现使配电网更加活跃。因此，电力系统底层的电力市场参与者希望参与与本地能源管理问题相关的决策过程，从而提高配电网络中能源交易的效率。本文提出了通过终端用户、聚合器和配电系统运营商 (DSO) 来管理能源灵活性的垄断和基于游戏的方法，它们被定义为配电系统中的代理。除了，一个 33 总线配电网络被认为是基于配电网络中终端用户和聚合器的灵活性行为的影响来评估我们提出的能源灵活性管理模型方法的性能。根据仿真结果得出的结论是，虽然垄断方法对分销网络中的所有代理都有利可图，但基于游戏的方法对最终用户却无利可图。