当前位置: X-MOL 学术arXiv.cs.GT › 论文详情
Expressive mechanisms for equitable rent division on a budget
arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory Pub Date : 2019-02-08 , DOI: arxiv-1902.02935
Rodrigo A. Velez

We study the incentive properties of envy-free mechanisms for the allocation of rooms and payments of rent among financially constrained roommates. Each agent reports her values for rooms, her housing earmark (soft budget), and an index that reflects the difficulty the agent experiences from having to pay over this amount. Then an envy-free allocation for these reports is recommended. We identify conditions under which the complete information non-cooperative outcomes of these mechanisms are exactly the envy-free allocations with respect to true preferences.
更新日期:2020-02-12

 

全部期刊列表>>
物理学研究前沿热点精选期刊推荐
chemistry
《自然》编辑与您分享如何成为优质审稿人-信息流
欢迎报名注册2020量子在线大会
化学领域亟待解决的问题
材料学研究精选新
GIANT
自然职场线上招聘会
ACS ES&T Engineering
ACS ES&T Water
ACS Publications填问卷
屿渡论文,编辑服务
阿拉丁试剂right
南昌大学
王辉
南方科技大学
刘天飞
隐藏1h前已浏览文章
课题组网站
新版X-MOL期刊搜索和高级搜索功能介绍
ACS材料视界
天合科研
x-mol收录
X-MOL
苏州大学
廖矿标
深圳湾
试剂库存
down
wechat
bug