This study investigates the operations of a healthcare alliance, where two types of independent hospitals [general hospitals (GHs) and community healthcare centers (CHCs)] collaborate in capacity allocation and revenue management to improve efficiency and revenue. Specifically, the GH allocates part of its capacity to establish a dedicated green channel for referral patients from the CHC based on a negotiated revenue sharing scheme. Generally, independent hospitals, like GHs and CHCs, in the healthcare delivery system provide complementary and substitute services due to the referral process and patients choice. Both service providers need each other, and their collaboration is very beneficial to their own market share. We propose a two-stage game-theoretic approach to study the optimal incentive and coordination mechanisms of the healthcare alliances. In the first-stage cooperative game, two providers negotiate fixed proportion rates to share the revenue from referral patients. In the second-stage non-cooperative game, the GH makes the capacity allocation decision and the CHC decides the treatment threshold to maximize their own revenues. We derive a revenue-sharing scheme that is efficient, in the sense that the decentralized system can achieve the same revenue as the situation where a a central planner manages the alliance. When the capacity of the CHC and the number of patients visiting the CHC for the first diagnosis is large enough, the CHC is willing to take more efforts to treat more patients with alliances. In our study, simulation is employed to analyze the characteristics of the healthcare alliances as a supplement of theoretical analyses and a verification of the revenue-sharing scheme’s feasibility and efficiency. The equilibrium decisions obtained through simulation provides suggestions of much practical value for the operation of healthcare alliances.

这项研究调查了医疗保健联盟的运作，在该联盟中，两种类型的独立医院[普通医院（GH）和社区医疗中心（CHC）]在容量分配和收入管理方面进行协作以提高效率和收入。具体来说，GH会根据协商的收益分成方案，分配其部分能力为CHC的转诊患者建立专用的绿色渠道。通常，由于转诊过程和患者的选择，医疗保健提供系统中的独立医院（如GH和CHC）提供补充和替代服务。两家服务提供商彼此需要，他们的合作非常有利于他们自己的市场份额。我们提出了一个两阶段博弈论方法来研究医疗保健联盟的最佳激励和协调机制。在第一阶段的合作博弈中，两个提供者协商固定的比例费率，以分享转诊患者的收入。在第二阶段的非合作博弈中，GH做出容量分配决定，而CHC决定治疗阈值以最大化自身收益。从分散系统可以实现与中央计划者管理联盟的情况相同的意义上讲，我们得出了一种有效的收益分享方案。当CHC的容量和首次诊断出访CHC的患者人数足够大时，CHC愿意付出更多的努力来治疗更多的结盟患者。在我们的研究中 通过模拟分析来分析医疗保健联盟的特征，作为理论分析的补充和对收入共享计划的可行性和效率的验证。通过模拟获得的均衡决策为医疗保健联盟的运营提供了许多实用价值的建议。