This study investigates the inventory sharing policy of a professional optics product supply chain based on a real case study. The supply chain sells a product via two sales agents with equal power. The manufacturer receives a single order from each agent at the beginning of the selling season. Stock is kept in the manufacturer’s central warehouse. Thus, the agents hold virtual inventory only. To obtain greater flexibility and earn more profit, the agents implement an inventory sharing policy between themselves, under which they can trade the excess product by negotiation. This study seeks to answer three questions regarding the implementation of inventory sharing: (1) Does inventory sharing always benefit all members of the supply chain? (2) Should the manufacturer charge agents service fees and if so, how much? (3) What is the mechanism for achieving an all-win situation? By formulating the problem as a mixed Stackelberg and Nash-bargaining game, this study observes that the current negotiation mechanism does not always benefit the supply chain and the manufacturer, because it gives too much flexibility to agents. An all-win leading inventory sharing mechanism is then proposed, and managerial insights are generated.

中文翻译：

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与同等实力代理商共享专业光学产品供应链库存

本研究基于真实案例研究了专业光学产品供应链的库存共享政策。供应链通过两个具有同等权力的销售代理销售产品。制造商在销售季节开始时从每个代理处收到一个订单。库存保存在制造商的中央仓库中。因此，代理仅持有虚拟库存。为了获得更大的灵活性并赚取更多的利润，代理商之间实施了库存共享政策，在这种政策下，他们可以通过谈判交易多余的产品。本研究旨在回答关于实施库存共享的三个问题：（1）库存共享是否总是有益于供应链的所有成员？(2) 制造商是否应收取代理服务费，如果是，多少？（3）实现共赢的机制是什么？通过将问题表述为 Stackelberg 和 Nash 讨价还价的混合博弈，本研究观察到当前的谈判机制并不总是有利于供应链和制造商，因为它给了代理商太多的灵活性。然后提出了一个双赢的领先库存共享机制，并产生了管理见解。