This paper is about the statics and dynamics of belief states that are represented by pairs consisting of an agent’s credences (represented by a subjective probability measure) and her categorical beliefs (represented by a set of possible worlds). Regarding the static side, we argue that the latter proposition should be coherent with respect to the probability measure and that its probability should reach a certain threshold value. On the dynamic side, we advocate Jeffrey conditionalisation as the principal mode of changing one’s belief state. This updating method fits the idea of the Lockean Thesis better than plain Bayesian conditionalisation, and it affords a flexible method for adding and withdrawing categorical beliefs. We show that it fails to satisfy the traditional principles of Inclusion and Preservation for belief revision and the principle of Recovery for belief withdrawals, as well as the Levi and Harper identities. We take this to be a problem for the latter principles rather than for the idea of coherent belief change.

中文翻译：

---

概率、连贯信念和连贯信念变化

这篇论文是关于信念状态的静态和动态，它们由代理的信任（由主观概率度量表示）和她的分类信念（由一组可能的世界表示）组成的对表示。关于静态方面，我们认为后一个命题在概率测度方面应该是连贯的，并且其概率应该达到某个阈值。在动态方面，我们主张将杰弗里条件化作为改变一个人的信念状态的主要模式。这种更新方法比简单的贝叶斯条件化更符合洛克论题的思想，并且提供了一种灵活的方法来添加和撤回分类信念。我们表明它不能满足传统的信仰修正的包容和保存原则和信仰撤回的恢复原则，以及列维和哈珀的身份。我们认为这是后一原则的问题，而不是连贯的信念改变的想法。