Actors in the Prisoner’s Dilemma agent-based model presented here decide between cooperation and defection in binary interactions determined by distance and overall gains. The paper thus tries to answer one of the fundamental questions of international politics: how does cooperative behavior perform in an environment governed by power and location? Two kinds of noise and the reward for mutual cooperation oscillating between temptation and punishment payoffs with a variable speed were added similarly like few completely new strategies inspired by foreign policy behavior of states. The initial success of generous reciprocal altruists is no surprise, but the lacking relationship between frequency of interactions and cooperativeness at the level of pairs already suggests some similarity with the system of states. Yet, the most important outcome is victory of the balance of threat strategy in all reruns with a heterogeneous pool of actors, despite the fact that this strategy was one of the least cooperative ones. At the same time, rules pre-selected by their success in the homogeneous and cooperative environment were still able to sustain intensive cooperation among themselves even within the heterogeneous pool of strategies.

中文翻译：

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在由距离和总体收益确定的交互中平衡威胁

此处提出的基于囚徒困境代理模型中的参与者在由距离和总体收益决定的二元交互中决定合作与背叛。因此，本文试图回答国际政治的一个基本问题：合作行为在权力和位置支配的环境中如何表现？两种噪音和相互合作的奖励在诱惑和惩罚回报之间以变速的速度振荡，就像很少有受国家外交政策行为启发的全新策略一样。慷慨互惠的利他主义者最初的成功并不令人意外，但互动频率与配对水平上的合作之间缺乏关系已经表明与国家系统有一些相似之处。然而，最重要的结果是所有重演中的威胁平衡战略都取得了胜利，行动者各不相同，尽管事实上该战略是最不合作的战略之一。同时，在同质和合作环境中成功预先选择的规则，即使在异质的策略池中，仍然能够维持它们之间的密集合作。