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A note on optimal contracting with public ex post information under limited liability
International Journal of Game Theory ( IF 0.6 ) Pub Date : 2019-05-17 , DOI: 10.1007/s00182-019-00674-4 Daniel Danau , Annalisa Vinella
International Journal of Game Theory ( IF 0.6 ) Pub Date : 2019-05-17 , DOI: 10.1007/s00182-019-00674-4 Daniel Danau , Annalisa Vinella
Riordan and Sappington (J Econ Theory 45:189–199, 1988) show that in an agency relationship in which the agent’s type is correlated with a public ex post signal, the principal may attain first best (full surplus extraction and efficient output levels) if the agent is faced with a lottery such that each type is rewarded for one signal realization and punished equally for all the others. Gary-Bobo and Spiegel (RAND J Econ 37:431–448, 2006) show that there exist locally incentive compatible lotteries such that limited liability constraints are satisfied, only if these constraints are satisfied when that kind of lottery is used. We explore how lotteries should be designed to attain not only local but also global incentive compatibility when the agent is protected by limited liability. The main issue with global incentive compatibility rests with intermediate types being potentially attractive reports to both lower and higher types. A lottery including three levels of profit (rather than only two) is found to be optimal under limited liability, in that it is most likely to be globally incentive compatible, if local incentive constraints are strictly satisfied. Conditions for first-best implementation are identified.
中文翻译:
有限责任下公开事后信息最优契约的说明
Riordan 和 Sappington (J Econ Theory 45:189–199, 1988) 表明,在代理人的类型与公共事后信号相关的代理关系中,委托人可能会达到最佳(完全剩余提取和有效产出水平)如果代理面临彩票,使得每种类型都因一个信号实现而获得奖励,而对所有其他类型则受到同等惩罚。Gary-Bobo 和 Spiegel (RAND J Econ 37:431–448, 2006) 表明存在本地激励兼容的彩票,使得有限责任约束得到满足,只有当使用这种彩票时这些约束得到满足。我们探讨了当代理人受有限责任保护时,应如何设计彩票以实现本地和全球激励的兼容性。全局激励兼容性的主要问题在于中间类型对较低和较高类型的潜在有吸引力的报告。发现包含三个利润水平(而不是只有两个)的彩票在有限责任下是最优的,因为如果严格满足局部激励约束,它最有可能与全局激励兼容。确定了最佳实施的条件。
更新日期:2019-05-17
中文翻译:
有限责任下公开事后信息最优契约的说明
Riordan 和 Sappington (J Econ Theory 45:189–199, 1988) 表明,在代理人的类型与公共事后信号相关的代理关系中,委托人可能会达到最佳(完全剩余提取和有效产出水平)如果代理面临彩票,使得每种类型都因一个信号实现而获得奖励,而对所有其他类型则受到同等惩罚。Gary-Bobo 和 Spiegel (RAND J Econ 37:431–448, 2006) 表明存在本地激励兼容的彩票,使得有限责任约束得到满足,只有当使用这种彩票时这些约束得到满足。我们探讨了当代理人受有限责任保护时,应如何设计彩票以实现本地和全球激励的兼容性。全局激励兼容性的主要问题在于中间类型对较低和较高类型的潜在有吸引力的报告。发现包含三个利润水平(而不是只有两个)的彩票在有限责任下是最优的,因为如果严格满足局部激励约束,它最有可能与全局激励兼容。确定了最佳实施的条件。