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Optimal pricing for new product entry under free strategy
Information Technology and Management ( IF 2.310 ) Pub Date : 2016-11-17 , DOI: 10.1007/s10799-016-0271-7
Guofang Nan , Xingtao Li , Zan Zhang , Minqiang Li

A growing number of firms in software industry are embracing free entry strategy to promote product adoption. The prevalence of free strategy can be partly attributed to the positive network externalities exhibited by the information goods. In this paper, we model a new firm’s entry into an existing market with the free strategy. Consumers can use the new product’s basic functionality for free and pay a subscription fee for accessing the add-ons. The entrant firm’s new product infringes on the market in one of the three ways: homogeneous product competition, high-end encroachment and low-end encroachment. We find that the equilibrium market structure varies across the three settings. In particular, there exists a Bertrand equilibrium when the new firm provides a homogeneous product. When the new firm offers a heterogeneous product, our results show that the network externalities intensify the price competition and thus lead to a reduction in the profits. Moreover, whether the new firm should encroach on the existing market with high-end product or low-end product depends on the level of switching cost. If the switching cost is low, the new firm will benefit more from high-end encroachment and vice versa. We also find that it is not always optimal for the new firm to adopt the free entry strategy. In the high-end encroachment, the new firm will be better off providing a product for free if the network intensity is high enough, whereas in the low-end encroachment, the free strategy is dominant only when the network intensity falls within a given threshold.

中文翻译:

免费策略下新产品的最优定价

越来越多的软件行业公司采用免费进入策略来促进产品采用。自由策略的盛行可以部分归因于信息商品所表现出的积极的网络外部性。在本文中,我们使用免费策略为新公司进入现有市场建模。消费者可以免费使用新产品的基本功能,并支付访问附加组件的订阅费。进入公司的新产品以三种方式之一侵害市场:同质产品竞争,高端竞争和低端竞争。我们发现均衡市场结构在三种情况下都不同。特别是,当新公司提供同质产品时,存在伯特兰均衡。当新公司提供异构产品时,我们的结果表明,网络外部性加剧了价格竞争,从而导致利润减少。此外,新公司是否应使用高端产品或低端产品来占领现有市场取决于转换成本的水平。如果转换成本较低,那么新公司将从高端竞争中受益更多,反之亦然。我们还发现,新公司采用自由进入策略并非总是最佳选择。在高端竞争中,如果网络强度足够高,新公司将更好地免费提供产品,而在低端竞争中,仅当网络强度在给定阈值之内时,免费策略才占主导地位。新公司是应该使用高端产品还是低端产品来占领现有市场取决于交换成本的水平。如果转换成本较低,那么新公司将从高端竞争中受益更多,反之亦然。我们还发现,新公司采用自由进入策略并非总是最佳选择。在高端竞争中,如果网络强度足够高,新公司将更好地免费提供产品,而在低端竞争中,仅当网络强度在给定阈值之内时,免费策略才占主导地位。新公司是应该使用高端产品还是低端产品来占领现有市场取决于交换成本的水平。如果转换成本较低,那么新公司将从高端竞争中受益更多,反之亦然。我们还发现,新公司采用自由进入策略并非总是最佳选择。在高端竞争中,如果网络强度足够高,新公司将更好地免费提供产品,而在低端竞争中,仅当网络强度在给定阈值之内时,免费策略才占主导地位。我们还发现,新公司采用自由进入策略并非总是最佳选择。在高端竞争中,如果网络强度足够高,新公司将更好地免费提供产品,而在低端竞争中,仅当网络强度在给定阈值之内时,免费策略才占主导地位。我们还发现,新公司采用自由进入策略并非总是最佳选择。在高端竞争中,如果网络强度足够高,新公司将更好地免费提供产品,而在低端竞争中,仅当网络强度在给定阈值之内时,免费策略才占主导地位。
更新日期:2016-11-17
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