Using a network approach we provide a characterization of a separating equilibrium for standard signaling games where the sender’s payoff function is quasi-linear. Given a strategy of the sender, we construct a network where the node set and the length between two nodes are the set of the sender’s type and the difference of signaling costs, respectively. Construction of a separating equilibrium is then equivalent to constructing the length between two nodes in the network under the condition that the response of the receiver is a node potential. When the set of the sender’s type is a real interval, shortest path lengths are antisymmetric and a node potential is unique up to a constant. A strategy of the sender in a separating equilibrium is characterized by some differential equation with a unique solution. Our results can be readily applied to a broad range of economic situations, such as for example the standard job market signaling model of Spence, a model not captured by earlier papers.

中文翻译：

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拟线性信号博弈中的分离均衡

我们使用网络方法为标准信号博弈提供了分离均衡的特征，其中发送方的收益函数是准线性的。给定发送方的策略，我们构建一个网络，其中节点集和两个节点之间的长度分别为发送方类型集和信令开销差集。在接收器的响应为节点电位的情况下，分离均衡的构建等效于构建网络中两个节点之间的长度。当发送者类型的集合是一个实数区间时，最短路径长度是反对称的，并且一个节点势在一个常数之前是唯一的。发送者在分离均衡中的策略的特征在于一些具有唯一解的微分方程。