Tight security proofs allow for shorter security parameters and better efficiency. In this paper, we firstly present a new signature scheme, SSSTR, which is strongly existentially unforgeable under adaptively chosen message attacks and whose security is tightly related to Strong Diffie–Hellman assumption in the standard model, and then give two identity-based signatures which are existentially unforgeable under adaptively chosen message and identity attacks and whose security is also tightly related to Strong Diffie–Hellman assumption in the standard model.

中文翻译：

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标准模型中基于身份的签名

严格的安全证明允许更短的安全参数和更高的效率。在本文中，我们首先提出了一种新的签名方案，SSSTR，它在自适应选择的消息攻击下具有强存在性不可伪造性，其安全性与标准模型中的强 Diffie-Hellman 假设密切相关，然后给出了两个基于身份的签名在自适应选择的消息和身份攻击下，它们在存在上是不可伪造的，并且其安全性也与标准模型中的强 Diffie-Hellman 假设密切相关。