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Costly signalling theory and dishonest signalling
Theoretical Ecology ( IF 1.6 ) Pub Date : 2019-05-04 , DOI: 10.1007/s12080-019-0429-0
Shan Sun , Michal Johanis , Jan Rychtář

We analyze the model of costly signalling theory and show that dishonest signalling is still a possible outcome even for costly indices that cannot be faked. We assume that signallers pay the cost for sending a signal and that the cost correlates negatively with signaller’s quality q and correlates positively with signal’s strength s. We show that for any given function f with continuous derivative, there is a cost function t(s, q) increasing in s and decreasing in q so that when the signaller of quality q optimizes the strength of the signal, it will send the signal of strength f(q). In particular, optimal signals can follow any given function f. Our results can explain the curvilinear relationship between the strength of signals and physical condition of three-spined stickleback (Gasterosteus aculeatus).

中文翻译:

昂贵的信号论和不诚实的信号

我们分析了昂贵的信号理论模型,并表明,即使对于无法伪造的昂贵指标,不诚实的信号仍然是可能的结果。我们假设发信号器为发送信号付出了成本,并且该成本与信号器的质量q呈负相关,与信号强度s呈正相关。我们表明,对于任何具有连续导数的函数f,都有一个成本函数tsq)在s中增加而在q中减少,因此当质量为q的信号发送器优化信号强度时,它将发送信号强度fq)。特别地,最佳信号可以遵循任何给定的函数f。我们的结果可以解释信号强度与三刺背鱼(Gasterosteus aculeatus)的身体状况之间的曲线关系。
更新日期:2019-05-04
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