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Countering Statistical Attacks in Cloud-Based Searchable Encryption
International Journal of Parallel Programming ( IF 1.5 ) Pub Date : 2018-06-30 , DOI: 10.1007/s10766-018-0584-8
M. A. Manazir Ahsan , Ihsan Ali , Mohd Yamani Idna Bin Idris , Muhammad Imran , Muhammad Shoaib

Searchable encryption (SE) is appearing as a prominent solution in the intersection of privacy protection and efficient retrieval of data outsourced to cloud computing storage. While it preserves privacy by encrypting data, yet supports search operation without data leakage. Due to its applicability, many research communities have proposed different SE schemes under various security definitions with numerous customary features (i.e. multi keyword search, ranked search). However, by reason of multi-keyword ranked search, SE discloses encrypted document list corresponding to multiple (secure) query keywords (or trapdoor). Such disclosure of statistical information helps an attacker to analyze and deduce the content of the data. To counter statistical information leakage in SE, we propose a scheme referred to as Countering Statistical Attack in Cloud based Searchable Encryption (CSA-CSE) that resorts to randomness in all components of an SE. CSA-CSE adopts inverted index that is built with a hash digest of a pair of keywords. Unlike existing schemes, ranking factors (i.e. relevance scores) rank the documents and then they no longer exist in the secure index (neither in order preserving encrypted form). Query keywords are also garbled with randomness in order to hide actual query/result statistics. Our security analysis and experiment on request for comments database ensure the security and efficiency of CSA-CSE.

中文翻译:

对抗基于云的可搜索加密中的统计攻击

可搜索加密 (SE) 正在成为隐私保护和外包给云计算存储的数据的高效检索交叉点的突出解决方案。它通过对数据进行加密来保护隐私,同时支持搜索操作而不会泄露数据。由于其适用性,许多研究社区在各种安全定义下提出了不同的 SE 方案,具有许多习惯特征(即多关键字搜索、排名搜索)。然而,由于多关键字排名搜索,SE公开了与多个(安全)查询关键字(或陷门)对应的加密文档列表。这种统计信息的披露有助于攻击者分析和推断数据的内容。为了应对 SE 中的统计信息泄漏,我们提出了一种称为在基于云的可搜索加密(CSA-CSE)中对抗统计攻击的方案,该方案在 SE 的所有组件中采用随机性。CSA-CSE 采用倒排索引,由一对关键字的哈希摘要构建而成。与现有方案不同,排序因素(即相关性分数)对文档进行排序,然后它们不再存在于安全索引中(既不按顺序保留加密形式)。查询关键字也随机乱码,以隐藏实际的查询/结果统计信息。我们对评论请求数据库的安全分析和实验确保了 CSA-CSE 的安全性和效率。排序因素(即相关性分数)对文档进行排序,然后它们不再存在于安全索引中(也不是为了保留加密形式)。查询关键字也随机乱码,以隐藏实际的查询/结果统计信息。我们对评论请求数据库的安全分析和实验确保了 CSA-CSE 的安全性和效率。排序因素(即相关性分数)对文档进行排序,然后它们不再存在于安全索引中(也不是为了保留加密形式)。查询关键字也随机乱码,以隐藏实际的查询/结果统计信息。我们对评论请求数据库的安全分析和实验确保了 CSA-CSE 的安全性和效率。
更新日期:2018-06-30
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