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Strategy-Proof Spectrum Allocation among Multiple Operators for Demand Varying Wireless Networks
arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory Pub Date : 2020-01-20 , DOI: arxiv-2001.07003
Indu Yadav, Ankur A. Kulkarni, Abhay Karandikar

To address the exponentially increasing data rate demands of end users, necessitates efficient spectrum allocation among co-existing operators in licensed and unlicensed spectrum bands to cater to the temporal and spatial variations of traffic in the wireless network. In this paper, we address the spectrum allocation problem among non-cooperative operators via auctions. The classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) approach provides the framework for a strategy-proof and social welfare maximizing auction at high computational complexity, which makes it infeasible for practical implementation. We propose sealed bid auction mechanisms for spectrum allocation which are computationally tractable and hence applicable for allocating spectrum by performing auctions in short durations as per the dynamic load variations of the network. We establish that the proposed algorithm is strategy-proof for uniform demand. Furthermore, for non-uniform demand we propose an algorithm that satisfies weak strategy-proofness. We also consider non-linear increase in the marginal valuations with demand. Simulation results are presented to exhibit the performance comparison of the proposed algorithms with VCG and other existing mechanisms.

中文翻译:

多个运营商之间针对需求变化无线网络的策略证明频谱分配

为了满足最终用户呈指数级增长的数据速率需求,需要在许可和未许可频段的共存运营商之间进行有效的频谱分配,以满足无线网络中流量的时间和空间变化。在本文中,我们通过拍卖解决非合作运营商之间的频谱分配问题。经典的 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) 方法为高计算复杂度的策略证明和社会福利最大化拍卖提供了框架,这使其在实际实施中不可行。我们提出了用于频谱分配的密封投标拍卖机制,该机制在计算上易于处理,因此适用于通过根据网络的动态负载变化在短时间内执行拍卖来分配频谱。我们确定所提出的算法是针对统一需求的策略证明。此外,对于非均匀需求,我们提出了一种满足弱策略证明的算法。我们还考虑了边际估值随需求的非线性增长。仿真结果展示了所提出的算法与 VCG 和其他现有机制的性能比较。
更新日期:2020-01-22
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