Power systems are moving towards hybrid AC/DC grids with the integration of HVDC links, renewable resources and energy storage modules. New models of frequency control have to consider the complex interactions between these components. Meanwhile, more attention should be paid to cyber security concerns as these control strategies highly depend on data communications which may be exposed to cyber attacks. In this regard, this article aims to analyze the false data injection (FDI) attacks on the AC/DC interconnected system with virtual inertia and develop advanced diagnosis tools to reveal their occurrence. We build an optimization-based framework for the purpose of vulnerability and attack impact analysis. Considering the attack impact on the system frequency stability, it is shown that the hybrid grid with parallel AC/DC links and emulated inertia is more vulnerable to the FDI attacks, compared with the one without virtual inertia and the normal AC system. We then propose a detection approach to detect and isolate each FDI intrusion with a sufficient fast response, and even recover the attack value. In addition to theoretical results, the effectiveness of the proposed methods is validated through simulations on the two-area AC/DC interconnected system with virtual inertia emulation capabilities.

中文翻译：

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对具有虚拟惯性的混合交流/高压直流互连系统的虚假数据注入攻击——漏洞、影响和检测

通过集成 HVDC 链路、可再生资源和储能模块，电力系统正朝着混合 AC/DC 电网发展。新的频率控制模型必须考虑这些组件之间复杂的相互作用。同时，应更加关注网络安全问题，因为这些控制策略高度依赖于可能遭受网络攻击的数据通信。对此，本文旨在分析对具有虚拟惯性的交直流互联系统的虚假数据注入（FDI）攻击，并开发先进的诊断工具来揭示其发生情况。我们构建了一个基于优化的框架，用于漏洞和攻击影响分析。考虑攻击对系统频率稳定性的影响，结果表明，与没有虚拟惯性和正常交流系统的混合电网相比，具有并联 AC/DC 链路和模拟惯性的混合电网更容易受到 FDI 攻击。然后我们提出了一种检测方法，以足够快的响应来检测和隔离每个 FDI 入侵，甚至恢复攻击值。除了理论结果外，还通过对具有虚拟惯性仿真能力的两区域 AC/DC 互连系统进行仿真验证了所提出方法的有效性。