Abstract

In this paper, we address joint spectrum allocation and pricing problem in heterogeneous wireless access networks. In contrast to traditional static spectrum allocation approach, we model the spectrum as a market commodity, dynamically arbitrated by a regulatory agent with the aim of maximizing the social welfare. This is of particular importance with the dominance of wireless technologies in access networks and the sharp increase in the number of overlapping wireless technologies and networks. We designed a novel Walrasian mechanism called economic resource allocation and pricing based on a three-stage game model capable of considering multiple networks and clients with individual attributes and preferences. In the first stage, competition among networks for spectrum allocation is handled where the regulatory evaluates the social welfare and takes corrective action. In the bottom two stages, the complex interactions between clients and networks result in bitrate allocations and service pricings. The equilibrium condition is analyzed using the Walrasian market model which is argued to be the Nash equilibrium of the proposed game. The system behavior is analyzed through extensive simulations. The results confirm the effectiveness of the proposed mechanisms in moving the system towards maximal social welfare.

中文翻译：

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异构无线接入网中最优定价和资源分配的新型Walrasian机制设计

摘要

在本文中，我们解决了异构无线接入网络中的联合频谱分配和定价问题。与传统的静态频谱分配方法相比，我们将频谱建模为由监管机构动态仲裁的市场商品，目的是最大程度地提高社会福利。随着无线技术在接入网络中的统治以及重叠无线技术和网络数量的急剧增加，这尤其重要。我们基于三阶段博弈模型设计了一种新颖的瓦尔拉斯机制，称为经济资源分配和定价，该模型能够考虑具有个性和偏好的多个网络和客户。在第一阶段 在监管机构评估社会福利并采取纠正措施的情况下，要处理网络之间的频谱分配竞争。在最下面的两个阶段，客户端与网络之间的复杂交互导致比特率分配和服务定价。使用Walrasian市场模型分析均衡条件，该模型被认为是所提出博弈的Nash均衡。通过广泛的仿真来分析系统行为。结果证实了所提出机制在使系统朝着最大社会福利的方向发展的有效性。使用Walrasian市场模型分析均衡条件，该模型被认为是所提出博弈的Nash均衡。通过广泛的仿真来分析系统行为。结果证实了所提出机制在使系统朝着最大社会福利的方向发展的有效性。使用Walrasian市场模型分析均衡条件，该模型被认为是所提出博弈的Nash均衡。通过广泛的仿真来分析系统行为。结果证实了所提出机制在使系统朝着最大社会福利的方向发展的有效性。