Voting rules may fail to implement the will of the society when only some voters actively participate, and/or in the presence of sybil (fake or duplicate) voters. Here we aim to address social choice in the presence of sybils and voter abstention. To do so we assume the status-quo (Reality) as an ever-present distinguished alternative, and study Reality Enforcing voting rules, which add virtual votes in support of the status-quo. We measure the tradeoff between safety and liveness (the ability of active honest voters to maintain/change the status-quo, respectively) in a variety of domains, and show that the Reality Enforcing voting rule is optimal in this respect.

中文翻译：

---

部分参与的女巫弹性社会选择

当只有一些选民积极参与，和/或女巫（假或重复）选民在场时，投票规则可能无法实现社会的意愿。在这里，我们的目标是在存在女巫和选民弃权的情况下解决社会选择问题。为此，我们假设现状（现实）是一个永远存在的杰出选择，并研究现实强制投票规则，这些规则添加了支持现状的虚拟选票。我们在各种领域中衡量安全性和活跃度（分别是积极诚实的选民维持/改变现状的能力）之间的权衡，并表明现实强制投票规则在这方面是最佳的。