当前位置: X-MOL 学术arXiv.cs.GT › 论文详情
Bad cycles in iterative Approval Voting
arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory Pub Date : 2020-01-13 , DOI: arxiv-2001.04216
Benoît KloecknerLAMA

This article is about synchronized iterative voting in the context of Approval Voting. Assuming that, before an election, successive polls occur to which voters react strategically, we shall exhibit examples showing the possibility of cycles with strong negative properties (in particular, non election of an existing Condorcet winner, or possible election of a candidate strongly rejected by a majority of the electorate). We also show that such cycles persist if only a proportion of the voters adjust their ballot at each iteration and if their strategy changes when close ties occur.
更新日期:2020-01-14

 

全部期刊列表>>
2020新春特辑
限时免费阅读临床医学内容
ACS材料视界
科学报告最新纳米科学与技术研究
清华大学化学系段昊泓
自然科研论文编辑服务
中国科学院大学楚甲祥
上海纽约大学William Glover
中国科学院化学研究所
课题组网站
X-MOL
北京大学分子工程苏南研究院
华东师范大学分子机器及功能材料
中山大学化学工程与技术学院
试剂库存
天合科研
down
wechat
bug