As an important method of risk control in information systems and networks, cyber-insurance has attracted particular attention from both industry and academia. However, two prominent problems hamper the further growth of cyber-insurance. The correlated and interdependent properties of cyber-risks increase the economic risk of insurance companies considerably ; risk pooling can be impeded by these two properties. Further, this situation can be aggravated because cyber-insurance affects the investment for self-protection negatively. This phenomenon is regarded as the ex ante moral hazard. In this study, we establish a mathematical model based on a classic insurance theory to address the abovementioned problems, and propose an optimal cyber-insurance contract scheme that maximizes the expected utility of users. We also propose two personalized contract schemes to incentivize users to invest in self-protection under the no moral hazard and ex ante moral hazard conditions. Extensive experiments are conducted to evaluate the proposed approach, and the experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the approach.

作为信息系统和网络中重要的风险控制方法，网络保险引起了业界和学术界的特别关注。但是，两个突出的问题阻碍了网络保险的进一步发展。网络风险的相关性和相互依存性极大地增加了保险公司的经济风险；这两个属性可能会阻碍风险分担。此外，由于网络保险会对自我保护的投资产生负面影响，因此这种情况可能会加剧。这种现象被视为事前道德风险。在这项研究中，我们建立了一个基于经典保险理论的数学模型来解决上述问题，并提出了一种最佳的网络保险合同方案，该方案最大程度地提高了用户的预期效用。我们还提出了两种个性化合同计划，以激励用户在无道德风险和事前道德风险的条件下投资于自我保护。进行了广泛的实验以评估所提出的方法，并且实验结果证明了该方法的有效性和效率。