Private efforts to prevent and control biological pests and infectious diseases can be a public good, and so incentivizing private biosecurity management actions is both desirable and problematic. Compensation contracts can encourage biosecurity efforts, provide support against the collapse of economic sectors, and create an insurance network. We conceptualise a novel biosecurity instrument relying on formal compensation private-public partnerships using contract theory. Our framework explains how the public sector can harness increased private biosecurity measures by making payments to agents which depend both on their performance and that of the other stakeholders. Doing so allows the government to spread the risk across signatory agents. The framework also improves our understanding of government involvement due to public effects of biosecurity, influenced by the private agents’ capacity to derive private benefit from their own efforts on monitoring and control. Lastly, these theoretical results provide a foundation for further study of contractual responsibility sharing for pest management.

中文翻译：

---

生物安全公私伙伴关系：风险分担的机会

私人预防和控制生物害虫和传染病的努力可能是公共利益，因此激励私人生物安全管理行动既可取，也有问​​题。赔偿合同可以鼓励生物安全工作，为经济部门的崩溃提供支持，并建立保险网络。我们使用合同理论概念化了一种新的生物安全工具，该工具依赖于正式的公私合营伙伴关系。我们的框架说明了公共部门如何通过向代理商付款，这些措施既取决于其绩效，也取决于其他利益相关者的绩效，从而可以利用增加的私人生物安全措施。这样做可以使政府将风险分散到签署方之间。该框架还增进了我们对由于生物安全的公共影响而政府参与的理解，受私人代理从其自身的监控努力中获取私人利益的能力的影响。最后，这些理论结果为进一步研究有害生物管理的合同责任分担奠定了基础。