Psychological accounts of personal identity claim that the human person is not identical to the human animal. Advocates of such accounts maintain that the definition and criterion of death for a human person should differ from the definition and criterion of death for a human animal. My contention is instead that psychological accounts of personal identity should have human persons dying deaths that are defined biologically, just like the deaths of human animals. Moreover, if brain death is the correct criterion for the death of a human animal, then it is also the correct criterion for the death of a human person. What the nonidentity of persons and animals requires is only that they have distinct criteria for ceasing to exist.

中文翻译：

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为什么个人身份的心理学解释可以接受脑死亡标准和死亡的生物学定义。

关于个人身份的心理学解释认为，人与动物不是同一个人。这种说法的拥护者认为，人类死亡的定义和标准应与人类动物的死亡的定义和标准不同。相反，我的论点是，对个人身份的心理描述应该使人类死于生物学定义的死亡，就像人类动物的死亡一样。此外，如果脑死亡是人类死亡的正确标准，那么它也是人类死亡的正确标准。人与动物的非同一性仅要求它们具有停止存在的不同标准。