The debate between monists and pluralists in moral psychology has been framed as an argument over the number of "irreducible basic elements" that can be used to describe the extent of the moral domain: Do all moral values ultimately reduce to one principle (i.e., monism), or are there multiple irreducibly distinct moral values (i.e., pluralism)? I critique the premise of this debate, arguing that the breadth of the moral domain cannot be adequately represented, understood, or explained in terms of moral values. Instead, an adequate account of moral psychology must explain moral phenomena in terms of more basic elements: ontological frames.

中文翻译：

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道德的基本要素是什么？对道德心理学中一元论和多元论的争论的批评。

一元论者和多元论者之间在道德心理学上的争论被构架为一种可用来描述道德领域范围的“不可还原的基本要素”的论点：所有道德价值观最终都会归结为一个原则吗（即一元论） ），还是存在着多个无法还原的截然不同的道德价值观（即多元化）？我批评这场辩论的前提，认为道德领域的广度不能以道德价值观来充分地表现，理解或解释。取而代之的是，对道德心理学的充分解释必须以更基本的要素（本体论框架）来解释道德现象。