I explore the possibility and rationality of interpersonal mechanisms of doxastic self-control, that is, ways in which individuals can make use of other people in order to get themselves to stick to their beliefs. I look, in particular, at two ways in which people can make interpersonal epistemic commitments, and thereby willingly undertake accountability to others, in order to get themselves to maintain their beliefs in the face of anticipated “epistemic temptations”. The first way is through the avowal of belief, and the second is through the establishment of collective belief. I argue that both of these forms of interpersonal epistemic commitment can function as effective tools for doxastic self-control, and, moreover, that the control they facilitate should not be dismissed as irrational from an epistemic perspective.

中文翻译：

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在他人的帮助下保持真实：通过人际交往进行自我控制

我探讨了自我控制的人际关系机制的可能性和合理性，即个人可以利用他人来坚持自己的信念的方式。我特别关注人们可以通过两种方式做出人际认知承诺，从而乐于对他人负责，以使自己在预期的“认识论诱惑”下保持自己的信念。第一种方法是通过信仰的宣告，第二种方法是通过建立集体信仰。我认为，这两种形式的人际认知承诺都可以作为有效的自我控制工具，而且，从认知的角度看，不应将它们促进的控制视为不合理。