Multisectoral nutrition planning emerged in the early 1970's as a bold new approach to combating malnutrition in low-income countries. Conceptually elegant and operationally ambitious, it blossomed on paper but collapsed in practice notwithstanding vigorous promotion by international assistance agencies. This essay reviews the meteoric rise and fall of the multisectoral approach and then proceeds to examine its theoretical underpinnings. The essay concludes by identifying 12 lessons learned that, if heeded, can help the current generation of intersectoral initiatives against malnutrition to realize their potential. In retrospect, it was a mistake to assign responsibility for nutrition to economic planners and scientists who possessed little political influence or operational authority. Nutrition requires high-level political sponsorship if it is to command resources, be integrated with established ministerial responsibilities and have staying power. Nutrition planning bcame attractive to basically conservative governments anxious to accommodate international benefactors without having to accept more fundamental reforms; the analysis of malnutrition causality focused primarily on attributes of the malnourished and their families, not on the social, economic, and political order around them.

中文翻译：

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多部门营养规划：事后分析

多部门营养规划出现于 70 年代初，是在低收入国家对抗营养不良的一种大胆的新方法。尽管国际援助机构大力推动，它在概念上优雅且在操作上雄心勃勃，它在纸上蓬勃发展，但在实践中却失败了。本文回顾了多部门方法的迅速兴起和衰落，然后继续研究其理论基础。这篇文章最后确定了 12 条经验教训，如果加以注意，可以帮助当前这一代的跨部门倡议实现其潜力。回想起来，将营养责任分配给几乎没有政治影响力或运营权威的经济规划者和科学家是错误的。营养如果要获得资源、与既定的部长职责相结合并具有持久力，就需要高层的政治支持。营养计划对那些急于接纳国际捐助者而不必接受更根本性改革的基本保守的政府很有吸引力；对营养不良因果关系的分析主要侧重于营养不良者及其家庭的属性，而不是围绕他们的社会、经济和政治秩序。