I develop a rate-distortion analysis of signaling games with imperfect common interest. Sender and receiver should be seen as jointly managing a communication channel with the objective of minimizing two independent distortion measures. I use this analysis to identify a problem with 'functional' theories of deception, and in particular Brian Skyrms's: there are perfectly cooperative, non-exploitative instances of channel management that come out as manipulative and deceptive according to those theories.

中文翻译：

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欺骗为合作。

我开发了具有不完善的共同兴趣的信号游戏的速率失真分析。发送者和接收者应被视为共同管理通信信道，目的是最小化两个独立的失真措施。我使用这种分析来确定“功能性”欺骗理论的问题，尤其是Brian Skyrms的问题：根据这些理论，存在完全合作，非剥削的渠道管理实例，这些实例以操纵性和欺骗性方式出现。