Vaidyanathan et al. (this issue) offer provocative proposals for the striking lack of progress, after decades of basic and clinical research, in understanding the etiology of psychopathology. They engage a number of prominent issues. They do not (and need not) take a stand regarding the relative merits of DSM 5’s categorical premise and its almost exclusively psychological characterization of the manifestations of psychopathology vs. the merits of the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) initiative of the National Institute of Mental Health, with its embrace of dimensional conceptualizations of contributors to psychopathology and of biological phenomena as playing a critical role in understanding psychopathology. Six years after its announcement in 2009, RDoC is gaining traction but is subject to widespread misunderstanding in several critical ways. First, although it champions dimensional conceptualizations of psychopathology, it does not preclude traditional categorical conceptualizations. Second, the widely distributed RDoC matrix does not represent the final set of concepts RDoC seeks. The current matrix is merely a “draft” (http://www.nimh.nih.gov/research-priorities/rdoc/nimh-research-domain-criteria-rdoc.shtml#toc_matrix), an illustrative example, and is designed to be fully extensible as the literature merits. Third, RDoC is not bad news for psychological concepts or for established methods of studying psychopathology. On the contrary, RDoC offers an explicit, systematic antidote to the naive reductionism fostered by the Decades of the Brain that began in 1990 (Miller, 1996, 2010; Miller & Rockstroh, 2013). This is clear from examination of the rows of the proposed matrix, nearly all of which are psychological phenomena. Such dominance of psychology in the RDoC matrix reflects the definitional fact that psychopathology is a set of psychological phenomena, not a set of “brain diseases” as became fashionable to claim in the first Decade of the Brain (e.g., Hyman, 1998; Leshner, 1997). Fourth, in the nomological network, among its columns RDoC positions psychological measurements at the same logical level as biological measurements. Notably, in RDoC, psychological events are not assumed to be reducible to biological events, nor do biological events “underlie” psychological events. Psychological and biological symptoms are not merely at different “levels of analysis”. They are qualitatively different phenomena. Psychological and biological events are coincident (reflecting “contingent identity”), the psychological phenomena are not reducible to or logically the same as the biological phenomena (“necessary identity”, Fodor, 1968; Kozak & Miller, 1982; Miller & Kozak, 1993). RDoC is often characterized as a radical departure from the longstanding dominance of categorical assumptions about psychopathology, and it is, though it merely makes space for dimensional models alongside categorical models. More fundamentally radical is its resuscitation of psychology as an equal partner in the clinical science of psychopathology.

中文翻译：

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推动精神病理学向前发展

Vaidyanathan 等人。（本期）针对经过数十年的基础和临床研究，在理解精神病理学的病因学方面明显缺乏进展，提出了具有挑战性的建议。他们涉及一些突出的问题。他们没有（也不需要）就 DSM 5 分类前提的相对优点及其几乎完全是精神病理学表现的心理特征与美国国家心理研究所的研究领域标准 (RDoC) 倡议的优点采取立场健康，它接受了对精神病理学和生物学现象的贡献者的维度概念化，因为它在理解精神病理学方面发挥着关键作用。在 2009 年宣布 RDoC 六年后，RDoC 越来越受到关注，但在几个关键方面受到了广泛的误解。首先，虽然它支持精神病理学的维度概念化，但它并不排除传统的分类概念化。其次，广泛分布的 RDoC 矩阵并不代表 RDoC 寻求的最终概念集。当前的矩阵仅仅是一个“草案”（http://www.nimh.nih.gov/research-priorities/rdoc/nimh-research-domain-criteria-rdoc.shtml#toc_matrix），一个说明性的例子，并被设计完全可扩展，因为文献值得。第三，对于心理学概念或研究精神病理学的既定方法而言，RDoC 并不是坏消息。相反，RDoC 为始于 1990 年的大脑十年（Miller, 1996, 2010; Miller & Rockstroh, 2013）所培养的幼稚还原论提供了明确、系统的解药。从对建议矩阵的行的检查中可以清楚地看出这一点，几乎所有这些都是心理现象。心理学在 RDoC 矩阵中的这种主导地位反映了这样一个定义性事实，即精神病理学是一组心理现象，而不是在大脑的第一个十年中流行的一组“大脑疾病”（例如，海曼，1998 年；莱什纳， 1997）。第四，在规则网络中，RDoC 在其列中将心理测量定位在与生物测量相同的逻辑级别。值得注意的是，在 RDoC 中，心理事件不被假定为可还原为生物事件，生物事件也不是心理事件的“基础”。心理和生物学症状不仅仅处于不同的“分析水平”。它们是性质不同的现象。心理和生物事件是重合的（反映“偶然身份”），心理现象不能还原为生物现象或在逻辑上与生物现象相同（“必要的同一性”，Fodor，1968；Kozak & Miller，1982；Miller & Kozak，1993）。RDoC 通常被描述为彻底背离了长期以来一直占据主导地位的关于精神病理学的分类假设，尽管它只是为维度模型与分类模型一起腾出空间。更根本的是，它使心理学成为精神病理学临床科学中的平等伙伴。尽管它只是为维度模型和分类模型留出了空间。更根本的是，它使心理学成为精神病理学临床科学中的平等伙伴。尽管它只是为维度模型和分类模型留出了空间。更根本的是，它使心理学成为精神病理学临床科学中的平等伙伴。