Adaptationists explain the evolution of religion from the cooperative effects of religious commitments, but which cooperation problem does religion evolve to solve? I focus on a class of symmetrical coordination problems for which there are two pure Nash equilibriums: (1) ALL COOPERATE, which is efficient but relies on full cooperation; (2) ALL DEFECT, which is inefficient but pays regardless of what others choose. Formal and experimental studies reveal that for such risky coordination problems, only the defection equilibrium is evolutionarily stable. The following makes sense of otherwise puzzling properties of religious cognition and cultures as features of cooperative designs that evolve to stabilise such risky exchange. The model is interesting because it explains lingering puzzles in the data on religion, and better integrates evolutionary theories of religion with recent, well-motivated models of cooperative niche construction.

中文翻译：

---

传播秩序：宗教、合作生态位建设和风险协调问题

适应主义者从宗教承诺的合作效应来解释宗教的进化，但宗教进化要解决哪个合作问题？我关注一类对称协调问题，其中有两个纯纳什均衡：（1）ALL COOPERATE，它是有效的，但依赖于完全合作；(2) ALL DEFECT，这是低效的，但不管别人选择什么都会付出代价。正式和实验研究表明，对于此类危险的协调问题，只有缺陷平衡是进化稳定的。以下解释了作为合作设计的特征的宗教认知和文化的其他令人费解的特性，这些特性演变为稳定这种风险交换。这个模型很有趣，因为它解释了宗教数据中挥之不去的谜题，