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Active Inference and Cognitive Consistency
Psychological Inquiry ( IF 5.581 ) Pub Date : 2018-04-03 , DOI: 10.1080/1047840x.2018.1480693
Karl J Friston 1
Affiliation  

I know little about social psychology and less about cognitive consistency theory; however, I greatly enjoyed reading the deconstruction of this paradigm by Kruglanski et al. (this issue). I learned a lot and was struck repeatedly by the consilience between their treatment and complementary formulations in theoretical neurobiology. The underlying tenets of their argument emerge—in my world—from a Bayesian or variational treatment of perception and self-organized behavior. This is variously known as the free energy principle, active inference, predictive processing, or self-evidencing (Clark, 2013, Friston, 2010; Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, & Pezzulo, 2017; Hohwy, 2016). Particular flavors of this formulation have dominated cognitive neuroscience and aspects of philosophy for the past decade. For example, the Bayesian brain hypothesis (Kersten, Mamassian, & Yuille, 2004; Knill & Pouget, 2004) and predictive processing (Barrett & Simmons, 2015; Michael & De Bruin, 2015; Rao & Ballard 1999; Seth, 2013) are now predominant paradigms in cognitive neuroscience. Active inference generalizes this approach to provide an enactive or embodied treatment of action and perception. This resulting treatment bears some remarkable similarities to the ideas reviewed in Kruglanski et al. This commentary tries to establish the formal links between active inference and constructs in cognitive consistency theory in the hope that there may be some useful cross-fertilisation. In what follows, I briefly overview active inference with a special focus on the quantities needed to describe affective responses to new information and then unpack some key dialectics that speak to cognitive consistency, epistemic and motivational value, specific and nonspecific closure, and so on.

中文翻译:

主动推理和认知一致性

我对社会心理学知之甚少,对认知一致性理论知之甚少;然而,我非常喜欢阅读 Kruglanski 等人对这种范式的解构。(这个问题)。我学到了很多东西,他们的治疗方法与理论神经生物学中的补充公式之间的一致性让我一再震惊。在我的世界中,他们论证的基本原则来自对感知和自组织行为的贝叶斯或变分处理。这被称为自由能原理、主动推理、预测处理或不言自明(Clark,2013,Friston,2010;Friston、FitzGerald、Rigoli、Schwartenbeck 和 Pezzulo,2017;Hohwy,2016)。在过去十年中,这种公式的特殊风格一直主导着认知神经科学和哲学的各个方面。例如,贝叶斯大脑假设(Kersten, Mamassian, & Yuille, 2004; Knill & Pouget, 2004)和预测处理(Barrett & Simmons, 2015; Michael & De Bruin, 2015; Rao & Ballard 1999; Seth, 2013)现在是主流范式在认知神经科学中。主动推理概括了这种方法,以提供对行动和感知的主动或具体处理。由此产生的处理与 Kruglanski 等人评论的想法有一些显着的相似之处。这篇评论试图在认知一致性理论中建立主动推理和构念之间的正式联系,希望可能会有一些有用的交叉影响。在接下来的内容中,
更新日期:2018-04-03
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